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Introduction 
 
1. The Government would like to thank the Joint Committee for undertaking pre-legislative 
scrutiny (PLS) of the Draft Deregulation Bill. 
 
2. The Committee began with procedural matters, followed by chapters on the order-making 
power, the Growth Duty, Use of Land Provisions and other, wider concerns. The 
Government’s response to the report follows the same format.   
 
3. The Government is pleased to note that the Committee welcomed our efforts to reduce the 
burden on individuals, civil society, businesses and public sector organisations, and 
encouraged future Deregulation Bills.  
 
4. This Bill is one part of the on-going Deregulation agenda. As the Committee noted, the Bill 
sits alongside the Red Tape Challenge and the One in Two Out rule (formerly One in One 
Out). The measures in the Bill are a mixture of Red Tape Challenge measures that needed 
primary (and some secondary) legislation and a number of other measures identified by 
departments that need primary legislation in order to lift a burden.  
 
5. The Committee received the bulk of evidence on the order-making power, the Growth Duty, 
the Use of Land Provisions (‘Rights of Way’) and Clauses 1, 2, 3, 9, 28, 33 & schedule 14, 
35, 40 and 47.    
   
6. The Committee also raised questions on specific issues such as the potential reduction in 
parliamentary scrutiny, the deregulatory nature of the Bill and the evidence base behind 
certain clauses.  
 
7. In terms of procedure, the Committee raised points about the length of time allowed for their 
inquiry and devolution issues.  
 
Procedure of the Committee 
 
8. On the length of the inquiry, the Committee’s report says: 
 
Paragraph No. 7. “We take the view that, whilst the 12 week timetable may be 
regarded as a minimum starting point, a longer deadline should be agreed if, on a 
case by case basis, it is judged necessary in order to allow a committee to carry out 
its pre-legislative functions effectively. A deadline longer than the minimum would 
have been appropriate with regard to the draft Deregulation Bill given the range of 
issues covered by the draft Bill and the number of Government departments 
involved.” 
  
Paragraph No. 8. “Given that it is the Government’s intention that this should be a 
carry-over Bill and that, according to Mr Letwin, there is “plenty of time” to carry out 
further consultation if recommended by the Joint Committee, we question why a 
longer pre-legislative scrutiny inquiry period was not agreed.” 
 
9. The deadlines proposed for PLS by joint committees are considered on a case by case 
basis, and seek to balance the time required for scrutiny against that required to respond to 
Committees' recommendations and the requirements of the legislative programme as a 
whole. The Government recognises the breadth and complexity of this Bill and is grateful 
for the Committee's sensible approach taken to examining it in the time available. The 
deadline of five months, agreed by both Houses, is longer than that agreed for most joint 
committees and represents a reasonable timeframe for proper scrutiny of this Bill. 
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10. On devolution issues, the Committee’s report says: 
 
Paragraph No. 14. We sought assurance from the Government that the correct 
procedures (as set out, for example, in the Sewel Agreement in the case of Scotland), 
in terms of liaising with the devolved administrations and agreeing Legislative 
Consent Motions where needed, were being followed. We were assured that they 
were. 
 
11. We would like to reassure the Committee once again that we have taken full and 
appropriate consideration of devolution issues whilst drafting the Bill.  
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Order-making Power and Schedule 16 
 
12. The Committee received a great deal of evidence about the order-making power, on which 
the Committee’s report sets out a number of concerns and recommendations: 
 
Paragraph No. 67. “We therefore recommend that clauses 51 to 57 be removed from 
the draft Bill. Whilst we do not recommend the removal of Schedule 16, we 
recommend that the provisions in the Schedule be referred to the Law Commissions 
[the Law Commission for England and Wales, the Scottish Law Commission, and the 
Northern Ireland Law Commission] for confirmation, before the Committee stage of 
the Bill in the first House, that they are “no longer of practical use”.” 
 
13. The Government has carefully considered the views of those who provided evidence to the 
Committee in relation to the order-making power in clauses 51 to 57 and the Committee’s 
recommendations.   
 
14. Although we believe that an order-making power to disapply legislation that is no longer of 
practical use would be a useful additional tool for tidying up the statute book, we recognise 
that there is insufficient appetite for such a measure at this time. We therefore accept the 
Committee’s recommendation to remove clauses 51 to 57 from the Bill. 
 
15. We do not agree, however, that the provisions contained in Schedule 16 should be referred 
to the Law Commissions for confirmation that they are “no longer of practical use”. 
 
Schedule 16 
 
16. We would emphasise that Governments frequently repeal unneeded legislation and that 
this is considered part of ‘good housekeeping’ of the statute book. They are also the types 
of ‘housekeeping’ changes which are regularly dealt with in Bills or orders. To refer the 
provisions in Schedule 16 to the Law Commissions for confirmation would be most unusual. 
 
17. We disagree that Departments do not have the expertise to determine whether legislation is 
obsolete or know the importance of accuracy and giving consideration to saving, transitional 
or consequential provisions. An example of this type of consideration is seen in Part 1 of 
Schedule 5 to the Deregulation Bill which repeals the Deeds of Arrangement Act 1914 as 
part of a package of insolvency measures. Research by Government officials indicated that 
there was still one person who had a deed of arrangement under the 1914 Act, and so a 
decision was made to include a special saving provision in paragraph 3 of Schedule 5. No 
evidence has been submitted that any of the schedule 16 provisions are not obsolete. 
 
18. We agree that some of the provisions in Schedule 16 are the types of repeal candidates 
that can be referred to the Law Commissions, although we would point out that many of the 
provisions in Schedule 16 are secondary legislation and that SLR work is confined to 
primary legislation. 
 
The Law Commissions 
 
Paragraph No. 58. “The Law Commissions’ proposals for improvement with regard to 
producing more frequent and more responsive SLR Bills appear to us to answer the 
Government’s reasons justifying the proposed order-making power, namely to allow  
departments to follow their own timeframes and to repeal legislation in areas of 
particular concern to them. We query, however, how this can be achieved given the 
current size of the Law Commissions’ SLR teams. In principle, we think 
consideration should be given to an annual SLR Bill.” 
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Paragraph No. 65. “The skills, research and consultation needed to ensure that 
Parliament, external organisations and the public can be satisfied that a piece of 
legislation is genuinely obsolete strongly suggest that the Law Commissions are 
better placed to conduct that work than Government departments. Added to which, 
the independence of the Law Commissions from Government and their track record 
since 1965 reinforce the trust that Parliament places in the Law Commissions; and it 
is that trust which has enabled Parliament to fast-track non-controversial Law 
Commission Bills including SLR Bills. However, we believe that there is merit in the 
Government and the Law Commissions looking at ways to increase the through-put 
of the Law Commissions. We would expect, at the very least, that consideration will 
be given to increasing the number of lawyers deployed by the Law Commissions on 
SLR work.” 
 
19. The Law Commissions and the Government share the common objective of repealing 
obsolete legislation in order to reduce the size of the statute book and make it easier for 
those who use it. We endorse the Committee’s comments that the Law Commissions have 
had an excellent track record since 1965 of repealing obsolete legislation. 
 
20. The Government welcomes the Law Commission for England and Wales’ (the Commission) 
suggestions that Statute Law Repeals (SLR) Bills could be produced more frequently and 
be more responsive to modern needs. The Government will engage with the Commission 
on this point to see how we can best work together to achieve our shared objective.   
 
21. We do not agree, however, with the Committee’s recommendation to increase the number 
of lawyers deployed on SLR work. Rather, we agree with the former Chair of the 
Commission, Sir Terence Etherton, that it is in the field of Law Reform that the Commission 
plays its most influential role in society. 
 
22. The Government will therefore continue to work with the Commission to improve the 
process of removing legislation that is no longer of practical use from the statute book.   
 
 
Other provisions in the draft Bill which may have the effect of reducing 
Parliamentary scrutiny 
 
23. The Joint Committee had some concerns over the levels of Delegated Powers or the 
reduction in levels of Parliamentary Scrutiny, on which they took advice from the DPRRC: 
 
Paragraph No. 79. We accept the advice of the DPRRC that clause 7 gives rise to a 
point of principle about the unacceptability of ingredients of a criminal offence being 
outside Parliamentary scrutiny. We recommend that clause 7, in its present form, be 
removed from the draft Bill. 
 
Paragraph No. 84. Whilst we do not object to the general provision introducing 
ambulatory references into the 1995 Act, we note the advice of the Commons 
Transport Committee about the scope of the power and also of the DPRRC to the 
effect that the Secretary of State’s power to authorise directions in the proposed new 
section 306A(5) to (8) is too broad and an inappropriate delegation of legislative 
power. We recommend that these subsections should be amended so as to include a 
level of Parliamentary scrutiny. 
 
Paragraph No. 85. We agree with the DPRRC and recommend accordingly that the 
delegations of legislative power conferred by provisions inserted by clause 43(2) and 
(3) of the draft Bill and by Schedule 8, Part 6, to the draft Bill should be exercised by 
way of statutory instrument, subject to the negative procedure. 
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Clause 7 – Suppliers of fuel and fireplaces 
 
24. The DPRRC has indicated that moving the specification of authorised fuels and exempt 
fireplaces, from a parliamentary process to an administrative one is unacceptable. The 
DPRRC has also indicated that it does not accept the Government’s justification for this 
proposal and the policy objective could be met by making statutory instruments more 
frequently than the current biannual arrangement.   
 
25. Careful consideration has been given to the views expressed by the DPRRC but the 
Government’s view remains that this delegation of legislative power is appropriate. The 
points raised by the DPRRC are addressed below. 
 
26. The Government accepts that there is a need for legal certainty in the context of a criminal 
offence and its associated defence. The criteria for specification of products in the lists will 
be the same as that for specification in the current SIs; it will remain necessary to 
demonstrate that a product is capable of being used without producing any smoke or a 
substantial quantity of smoke. The Delegated Powers Memorandum for the draft Bill sets 
out the steps Government intends to take to ensure legal certainty is maintained in the 
move from subordinate legislation to administrative lists. The approved products will be 
published on the Defra smoke control webpages, which are already used to provide the 
public with information on specified products. The lists which will also be obtainable in 
paper format on request will contain the same information as currently included in the 
schedules of the statutory instruments and provide details of product name, fuel and 
manufacturers’ instructions. Unlike the schedules the list will also specify the date of 
product approval, amendment or withdrawal. There are some additional inherent legal 
safeguards to protect consumers and manufacturers. The first of these is the requirement in 
the Clean Air Act 1993 to publish the lists. The other is that a decision to approve amend or 
withdraw an authorisation/exemption would be subject to judicial review if it is not taken 
correctly. 
 
27. It is also worth noting that the smoke control statutory instruments for fuels and fireplaces 
(which now contain over 900 fireplaces and 63 fuels) have been issued since 1957 and 
biannually since 1970. There is currently is no evidence to suggest that the legislation has 
been challenged or that parliament has ever chosen to debate it.  
 
28. The Government’s rationale for this measure is that it will reduce the delay between 
products being recommended for approval and this approval being granted, bringing 
benefits to consumers and businesses by placing new technologies onto the market 
sooner. Once a product has been recommended for specification, Defra will be able to 
prepare a new entry to go on one of the published lists which will be revised on a monthly 
basis. Any new entries will undergo rigorous checking and require senior official approval 
within Defra but will not need to go through the same formal procedures as a statutory 
instrument. Defra anticipates that in most cases a product that is recommended for 
specification will be able to be added to the relevant list on the next occasion that the list is 
revised. Therefore, in most cases, it will not take longer than a month to complete the 
process of specifying a product. 
 
29. The DPRRC has challenged this rationale and indicated that it considers that any delays 
faced by businesses are attributable to the Government’s common commencement date 
policy which means that these statutory instruments are only made every six months. The 
department has considered the merits of producing the smoke control statutory instruments 
more frequently and concluded that this is not a viable option for achieving its objective.  
Making smoke control statutory instruments on a more frequent basis would significantly 
increase the workload of the Government without sufficiently reducing the existing burdens 
on business. In Defra’s experience it is necessary to allow at least two months for the 
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making and coming into force of the smoke control statutory instruments. This is to enable 
the instruments to be drafted, the necessary checks to be carried out, Ministerial 
submissions to be prepared, signature and laying, and compliance with the 21 day rule. To 
be included in a particular statutory instrument a product needs to be recommended for 
specification at least two months before the coming into force date. Therefore, regardless of 
how frequently the department makes these statutory instruments there will be a delay of at 
least two months between a product being recommended for specification and that 
specification taking effect. Past experience indicates that many additional products will be 
recommended for specification during this two-month period with the result that the 
statutory instrument will be out-of-date by the time it comes into force.  
 
Clause 48 – Ambulatory references to international shipping instruments 
 
30. The Government welcomes the Committee’s acceptance of the principle of introducing 
ambulatory references into legislation. 
 
31. However, the Government does not think that the Committee’s conclusion that sub-clauses 
(5) to (8) should be amended so as to include a level of Parliamentary scrutiny would meet 
the Government’s objective of reducing the number of statutory instruments. It would simply 
create an alternative to the original order making power which could be used to modify the 
effect of the ambulatory reference. As a result the Government has decided to remove 
these sub-clauses from the Bill. 
 
Justification of the level of parliamentary scrutiny in Clause 48 
 
32. The Committee also asked for views from the Transport Select Committee, who had 
concerns about a possible reduction in the level of parliamentary scrutiny. The Government 
disagrees that this would be the case. 
 
Paragraph No. 82. “The Commons Transport Committee also mentioned clause 48 
with reservations: “The clause appears to give a far-reaching power to the 
Government to amend UK law to reflect changes to maritime treaties, bypassing 
Parliament entirely. … We think that this issue should be explored further. This 
Clause may need to be amended to ensure that it cannot be used to prevent 
Parliamentary consideration of substantive changes to international instruments.” 
 
33. The Government’s rationale for including this clause in the draft bill was that the exercise of 
delegation conferred by the making of the ambulatory reference itself will only be possible 
where there is an existing power to make secondary legislation. The level of scrutiny 
appropriate to the subject matter of such legislation will have already been considered by 
Parliament and the department sees no reason why, if an ambulatory reference is to be 
included in such legislation, that there should be any change to the level of scrutiny. In a 
number of cases, particularly where the purpose of the legislation is to incorporate changes 
to the text of an international instrument, the secondary legislation is subject to the 
affirmative procedure. Parliament will, in almost all such cases, have the ability to consider 
the instrument containing the ambulatory reference under either the negative or affirmative 
procedure. 
 
34. A further consideration is that in most circumstances a change to UK law taking effect as a 
result of the operation of the ambulatory reference will only take effect following a change to 
an international agreement which will have been agreed to by the UK government and 
which will already have been notified to Parliament. The only instances where this will not 
be are cases where the international instrument contains a process whereby supplemental 
provision can be made through the issue of a code or a standard or changes can be made 
to the terms of the instrument through the so called tacit acceptance procedure whereby a 
change becomes effective and binds all the signatories of the agreement once a certain 
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number of signatories have agreed. However, in both cases the possibility of such changes 
being made without the further need for the explicit approval of the UK government was 
already present when the decision was made to accede to the agreement, so this should 
not of itself demand additional scrutiny. Moreover, the type of change made via adoption of 
a code or use of the tacit acceptance procedure is usually incremental, technical, and 
developed in close consultation with industry stakeholders. 
 
35. As noted in paragraph 31 the Government has decided to withdraw sub clauses (5) to (8) 
which provided for the issue of a ministerial direction to prevent an ambulatory provision 
from having effect or to modify its application from the Bill. 
 
Clause 43 - Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004: enforcement 
 
36. Under section 15 of the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 (‘the 2004 Act’) the Secretary of 
State allocates all enforcement responsibilities, including, it is believed, the conduct of 
prosecutions, to enforcement officers. Section 15 is thought to preclude the Attorney 
General from assigning functions relating the institution of proceedings for offences under 
the 2004 Act to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in England and Wales. 
 
37. The power to assign arises under section 3(2)(g) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 
(‘the 2005 Act’).  
 
38. This situation presents a problem for Defra and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority (‘the 
GLA’). While in the past Defra had its own in-house prosecutors, it no longer does. A partial 
solution has been found at an administrative level in that, although decisions to prosecute 
are made by GLA officers, they are able to obtain advice from the Crown Prosecution 
Service.  
 
39. The purpose of this clause is to make arrangements for the assignment of the relevant 
prosecution functions to the DPP for England and Wales under section 3(2)(g) of the 2005 
Act.  
 
40. The Committee concluded that the powers inserted by clause 43, assuming that they 
are intended to be general in scope, should be exercisable by statutory instrument 
subject to negative procedure. Its concerns were twofold:- 
 
(i) that the power can curtail the statutory functions of enforcement officers 
which are conferred by section 15 of the 2004 Act;  
 
(ii) that the power is conferred on the Secretary of State enabling him to remove 
these statutory functions from enforcement officers without requiring him, 
rather than merely enabling him, to transfer them elsewhere.  
 
41. In response to these comments, the clause has now been redrafted. The government trusts 
that these changes will meet the concerns of the Committee. 
 
42. The Clause now makes clear that:- 
 
a. the curtailment of the functions are to be set out in the terms of appointment or in 
the making of arrangements pursuant to section 15 of the 2004 Act; 
 
b. it will not be possible for a situation to arise where there is a ‘gap’, with neither 
enforcement officers nor the national prosecution authority being able to bring 
prosecutions.  
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Schedule 8, Part 6 – Regulation of the use of roads and railways, Rail Vehicle Accessibility 
Regulations (RVAR): exemption orders 
  
43. Schedule 8, Part 6, of the draft Bill seeks to amend the Equality Act 2010 so that 
exemptions from rail vehicle accessibility regulations (RVAR) can be made administratively, 
rather than by statutory instrument subject either to the negative or draft affirmative 
procedure, as now. A similar proposal was made when the Disability Discrimination Bill was 
considered by Parliament before it became the Disability Discrimination Act 2005. 
 
44. In its letter of 24 October 2013 to the Joint Committee, the DPRRC stated that it did “not 
consider that the position has changed greatly since our predecessor committee considered 
the matter in 2004-05”.  
 
45. The Government believes that the large reduction in the scope of RVAR that has taken 
place since the proposal was first considered justifies looking at this issue again.  
 
46. The scope of RVAR has been greatly reduced since 2004-05, such that they no longer 
apply to rail vehicles that are subject instead to EU accessibility rules. The new EU regime 
was introduced in 2008 and includes accessibility requirements for heavy rail trains. These 
rules require new, upgraded or renewed vehicles to comply with the technical specifications 
for interoperability for persons with reduced mobility (PRM TSI). The EU regulatory regime 
and the RVAR regime have similar technical requirements.   
 
47. The EU accessibility regime applies to mainline services, i.e. the majority of train services 
and almost three quarters of all rail vehicles. RVAR now applies only to a minority 
(approximately one quarter) of rail vehicles – mostly light rail such as trams, metros and 
underground but also including heritage and tourist vehicles and people movers at airports.  
 
48. The EU accessibility regime is implemented in the UK by the Railways (Interoperability) 
Regulations 2011. Whilst both the EU regime and the regime under the RVAR allow for 
exemptions to be granted, one difference between the two regimes is that exemptions from 
RVAR are made by statutory instrument, while exemptions from the PRM TSI can be made 
in Great Britain by the Secretary of State making an administrative determination. This 
administrative determination is subject in some cases to the approval of the European 
Commission – see regulation 14 of the 2011 Regulations.  
 
49. The Government believes it is incongruous that, if sought, exemptions for the hundreds of 
trains serving Gatwick, Stansted and Birmingham Airport stations would be subject to an 
administrative process, while any for the seventeen small vehicles moving passengers 
between terminals would remain subject to a process involving Statutory Instruments. Or 
that Parliament’s approval would be needed if any exemptions are sought for new vehicles 
on the Bluebell and Wensleydale steam railways but not if any are sought for the mainline 
trains taking visitors to those operators’ termini at East Grinstead and Northallerton.   
 
50. Removing the requirement for RVAR exemption orders to be made by statutory instrument 
will therefore bring the light rail regime more in line with the EU regime. We believe this is 
more proportionate, particularly given that other safeguards will remain, including 
consultation requirements, final approval by the Secretary of State and annual reporting by 
the Secretary of State to Parliament on the use of the exemption powers. 
 
51. In particular, the requirement in the Equality Act 2010 for the Secretary of State to consult 
the Disabled Persons Transport Advisory Committee1 (DPTAC) before granting an 
exemption is unchanged. The Government believes that DPTAC’s continued involvement in 
                                                            
1 DPTAC was established under section 125 of the Transport Act 1985 to advise the Government on the 
public passenger transport needs of disabled people. 
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considering the merits of each application will ensure that the needs of disabled people are 
given appropriate weight, while the Annual Report to Parliament will allow Parliament to 
consider whether the powers had been used excessively in the past year and call Ministers 
to account if it so wished. 
 
52. The Government made clear during its consultation that there would be no reduction in the 
strength of argument required before an exemption was granted. More background 
information about the proposal is set out in the Government’s March 2013 consultation, 
which can be found with a summary of the consultation responses 
at:https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/proposed-changes-to-exemptions-from-
rail-vehicle-accessibility-requirements  
 
53. A large majority of those who responded to the consultation supported the proposal, 
including representatives from the industry and DPTAC.   
 
Clause 28 – Model Clauses in petroleum licences: procedural simplification 
 
Paragraph No. 86. “The DPRRC also draws our attention to clause 28 on model 
clauses in petroleum licences. We consider this provision in Chapter 5 of [the 
Committee’s] report.” 
 
54. Upon the Committee’s advice regarding levels of consultation, the Government has decided 
to remove this Clause pending further consultation. While this Clause undergoes further 
consultation DECC lawyers will consider the comments of the DPRRC further. 
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Growth Duty 
 
55. The Committee received a great deal of written and oral evidence on the Growth Duty for 
Non-Economic Regulators. The Government is pleased that the Committee welcomed the 
Growth Duty: 
 
Paragraph No. 104. “We conclude that an economic growth duty on regulators is 
welcome provided that safeguards are in place to ensure that the growth duty does 
not take precedence over regulation and that the overriding and principal objective 
of regulators remains the protection of the public interest. We welcome the Minister's 
assurance on these points; that the duty will not "take precedence over the main 
reason for their existence ... [or] impinge on the confidence that the public have in 
the way they exercise their regulatory function".” 
 
56. The growth duty clauses are drafted to ensure that economic growth is a factor to take into 
account alongside regulators’ other statutory duties.  
 
57. The clauses provide the Secretary of State with a power to issue guidance on the ways in 
which regulatory functions may be exercised so as to promote economic growth. This will 
help regulators to understand how they can implement the duty. The Government has now 
published this guidance in draft. It explains that:  
 
a. The duty does not set out how economic growth ranks against existing duties as 
this is a judgment only a regulator can and should make.  
 
b. The duty does not oblige the regulator to place a particular weight on growth.  
 
58. Additionally, the draft guidance states that in instances where immediate enforcement 
action is required to prevent or respond to a serious breach, the growth duty would still 
apply but would not preclude immediate action. 
 
59. The final guidance will be published at an early stage to support Parliamentary passage of 
the Deregulation Bill. It will be subject to the affirmative procedure in due course. 
 
60. The clauses as drafted and the further detail provided by the draft guidance demonstrate 
that the necessary safeguards are in place. 
 
Paragraph No. 105. “Furthermore, we recommend that any powers given to Ministers 
to issue guidance, under clause 60(2)(b) of the draft Bill, on how the economic 
growth duty should be performed must not compromise the independence of 
regulators. The Government should consider making this clear on the face of the 
Bill.” 
 
61. The Government agrees that the guidance on the duty should not compromise the 
independence of regulators. The role of government is to determine the objectives for 
regulation, but then stand back.  The growth duty clarifies that growth is a factor for 
regulators to consider as they carry out their functions. Regulators will be free to decide 
how best to incorporate the duty into their decision-making and the growth duty will not 
affect their independence. 
 
62. There was a consensus across regulators and businesses responding to the consultation 
that guidance would be helpful. The Government thinks it is important to produce guidance 
to support regulators to implement the duty, but this it is only guidance; the power has been 
drafted carefully so that the guidance will not impose any new legal duties on regulators 
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and we do not therefore think it is necessary to amend the clause further to protect the 
independence of regulators. 
 
63. In addition, the guidance will be subject to the affirmative procedure so Parliament will be 
able to debate whether it strikes the appropriate balance in affording regulators the 
appropriate latitude to determine how best to implement the duty themselves. 
 
Paragraph No. 116. “Given the evidence we have received, we recommend that the 
Government review with some care the list of organisations to which the growth duty 
is intended to apply and consult fully with the organisations proposed. There is a 
risk that there may be, for some regulators, disproportionate and unintended 
consequences of the duty which need to be identified before the duty is introduced. 
We note the inclusion of the Equality and Human Rights Commission and the risks 
that its inclusion may present to its international standing.” 
 
64. The Government provided the Committee with an indicative list of those regulators whom it 
is considering to be in scope of the duty. 
 
65. The Government agrees that there is a need to ensure any unintended consequences are 
avoided. We have consulted extensively with regulators during the development of the 
policy and the consultation, as well as working closely with them to develop the draft 
guidance. We will continue to work with regulators during the parliamentary passage of the 
Bill to evaluate risks and refine this list further. 
 
66. The clauses provide that those who are in scope of the growth duty will be specified in a 
statutory instrument that will also be subject to the affirmative procedure. In addition, this 
order making power is subject to further consultation requirements. The Government is of 
the view that this will ensure that any unintended consequences are avoided. 
 
67. We note the Committee's observations on the EHRC and recognise the need to avoid 
inadvertently jeopardising its international standing. We will work closely with EHRC to 
consider this issue further before finalising the list of regulators. 
 
Paragraph No. 119. “We welcome the Government's reasons for proposing a duty on 
regulators to have regard in broad terms to "economic growth". “ 
 
68. We welcome the Committee’s recognition that the duty should require regulators to have 
regard to economic growth in broad terms, as the growth duty will require regulators to 
interpret economic growth in different ways in different circumstances. There will be some 
circumstances where it would be appropriate to consider short-term impact, for example, 
before issuing a small fine; and in other circumstances it would be more appropriate to 
consider long-term impact, for example, when considering how to implement new 
regulations. 
 
69. The term economic growth is clear and easy to understand, which is what the law should 
be. This duty applies to all regulators across a range of business sectors and in this context 
we therefore want to avoid an overly prescriptive approach. The Government has therefore 
decided to remove the provision from the draft clauses which would allow the Secretary of 
State to issue guidance on the meaning of economic growth as we no longer believe this is 
necessary. 
 
Paragraph No. 123. “We recommend that the Government consider by what criteria 
the impact of the duty could be demonstrated. We welcome the Minister's 
commitment to reflect further on the matter.” 
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70. As the Committee recognised, the economic impact of this policy is not easy to quantify, 
however the Government is publishing an impact assessment alongside this Bill, which sets 
out a preliminary assessment of some of the anticipated economic benefits of the growth 
duty. The impact assessment draws on evidence from a new survey of businesses’ 
interactions with regulators. This survey could be repeated in future, and supplemented with 
case study evidence, to track the impact the duty is having. We would expect an evaluation 
to detect any positive changes in the way business interacts with regulators which may over 
the longer term be an enabler of growth.  
 
71. At this stage the Government does not propose that the growth duty should impose 
additional reporting and monitoring requirements on regulators. However there will be an 
expectation that regulators are transparent in demonstrating regard for the duty using 
existing mechanisms like annual reports and publication of service standards in fulfilment of 
the Regulators’ Code. The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills will monitor the 
implementation of the growth duty through such existing reporting mechanisms in the first 
instance.  
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Use of Land Provisions 
 
72. The Government welcomes the Joint Committee’s recommendation that the package of 
rights of way reforms contained in the draft Bill should be accepted as a whole, in order to 
maintain the Stakeholder Working Group consensus: 
 
Paragraph No. 130. “We are aware that the law governing rights of way is highly 
contentious and commend the SWG for its achievement in reaching a consensus on 
the issue of recording unrecorded historic rights of way. We acknowledge also that 
maintaining that consensus requires the package of reforms contained in the draft 
Bill to be accepted as a whole.” 
 
Paragraph No. 139. “Whilst the SWG has managed to forge a consensus in support of 
the package, aspects of the new provisions are still under discussion both within the 
SWG and more widely. We expect the Government to show leadership and balance to 
take this vital part of our Report to a successful conclusion.” 
 
73. Defra is continuing to convene the Stakeholder Working Group and engage in wider 
discussions with stakeholders, such as the Intrusive Footpaths campaign, in order to see 
the rights of way reforms package through to a successful conclusion. 
 
Paragraph No. 145. “We have some concerns about the current backlog of rights of 
way applications and the likely additional pressures caused by the reforms and the 
imposition of the cut-off date. We question whether the implications for local 
authorities, in particular, have been fully assessed by the Government. Against this 
background, if these clauses are to go forward in this Bill, the Government will need 
to address the impact on local authorities.” 
 
74. The Government fully recognises the concerns about the current backlog of rights of way 
applications and the additional pressures likely to be caused by implementation of the cut-
off date. Indeed that is the reason behind the formation of the Stakeholder Working Group 
and implementation of their recommendations for simplifying and streamlining the current 
procedures, in order to complete the task of completing the definitive map. Although it has 
been suggested that measures such as replacing the Secretary of State’s role with the 
magistrates court shift a burden rather than removing it, the policy is specifically aimed at 
helping to reduce the local authority backlog. 
 
75. We cannot intervene in the way that local authorities choose to resource their rights of way 
work, but we can ease the burden of this work through reform. Local authorities are 
expected to make savings of almost £2 million a year through these measures. The 
Deregulation Bill presents an opportunity to reduce bureaucracy in this area and through 
these clauses. 
 
76. The key bodies that represent local authority rights of way practitioners on the Stakeholder 
Working Group are urging the Government to implement the reforms package. The 
Government is also continuing to engage with all local authorities across England through 
workshops and seminars organised by the Institute of Public Right of Way and Access 
Management to ensure that we assess both the practical and legal impacts of the Bill on 
local authorities. 
 
Paragraph No. 154. “We took the view at the outset that we would focus our attention 
on the clauses in the draft Bill and that we would not consider proposals for 
additional provisions. Given the level of public interest in rights of way, however, we 
draw to the attention of the Government the wider rights of way concerns raised in 
the course of this inquiry and urge them to take action to meet them.” 
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77. The Government recognises that there are difficulties with rights of way that go through 
family homes or conflict with current land management. We believe that the rights of way 
clauses in the Bill will address these concerns. 
 
78. Through some of these clauses Defra is working towards making effective the legislation 
that provides for a statutory ‘right to apply’ for landowners. This enables landowners, 
including householders, to make a formal application for diversion or extinguishment of a 
right of way on their land and appeal to the Secretary of State should the local authority 
refuse the application or fail to consider it. 
 
79. There are also clauses to ameliorate the effect on landowners of unrecorded or newly 
discovered public rights of way. We are introducing a presumption in favour of a 
landowner’s request for a diversion under certain prescribed circumstances, for example 
where a public right of way goes through a private garden, or working farmyard, or other 
areas where privacy, security or safety is an issue. 
 
80. There is clearly considerable debate on the need for further reform to the legislation 
governing the use of motorised vehicles on public rights of way and minor unsealed roads, 
especially in National Parks. We have sympathy with the concerns of those who have put 
forward proposals to protect routes that are vulnerable to damage by motorised vehicles. 
However, we believe that the motor vehicle issue is quite different in nature to that of 
recording historical rights of way and completing the definitive map. 
 
81. Defra considers that any change to the current government framework for managing 
motorised vehicles should be the subject of a full public consultation. We believe that this 
issue needs to be fully debated and a separate package of policy measures formulated for 
implementation, through legislation if necessary, when a suitable opportunity arises. 
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Other Clauses/Wider concerns raised by the Committee 
 
82. The Committee said that some measures had had insufficient consultation. The 
Government has noted their comments and looked at the specific clauses in more detail: 
 
Paragraph No. “168. While we very much welcome the opportunity to carry out pre-
legislative scrutiny on the draft Bill, we are clear that our scrutiny is not part of the 
consultation process that should be carried out by Government. Government should 
not rely on Parliament to consult on their behalf. However, they should take note of 
the evidence we received.” 
 
Paragraph No. 169. “[…] we conclude that the consultation carried out by the 
Government for a number of provisions in this Bill is inadequate. We are unable to 
comment on the adequacy of the consultation for clauses we did not examine in 
depth but we would encourage the Government to review critically the extent of its 
consultation on all clauses before the Bill is introduced to Parliament.” 
 
Paragraph No. 170. “We were pleased to note the Minister’s commitment to consult 
further on clauses that we identified needed fuller consultation. We recommend that 
further consultation is carried out on clauses 9, 28 and 40.” 
 
83. As a Government we wish to run proportionate and meaningful consultation processes. We 
feel that the clauses in the Bill, in general, have been subject to this process. However, we 
take note of the Committee’s specific references to Clauses 9, 28 & 40. 
 
84. Before Clause 9 on the authorisation of insolvency practitioners was brought forward there 
was both a period of consultation by correspondence and an opportunity for interested 
parties to attend a meeting on the issues. The issue was also the subject of further updates 
to insolvency practitioners. As part of the pre-legislative scrutiny process, we nonetheless 
heard comments, both from the Committee and from some parts of the insolvency 
practitioner industry, that there should be a further opportunity to comment. Therefore, the 
Government plans to invite any further such views in parallel with the progress of the Bill. If 
this process reveals new issues that have not yet been considered by the Government, we 
will aim to address this by amendment. 
 
85. The Government intends, on the Committee’s advice to remove Clauses 28 & 40 from the 
Deregulation Bill pending further consultation.  
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The Committee’s conclusions on deregulatory extent of the Bill 
 
86. The Committee commented on the deregulatory nature of some of the clauses of the Bill. 
Their recommendation was that the Government should satisfy itself that each of the 
clauses was deregulatory in nature. The Government has worked with Parliamentary 
Counsel to assure itself of this and we are content that each of the clauses does have an 
actual deregulatory effect and is not just shifting a burden. 
 
Paragraph No. 189. “We recommend that, before the Deregulation Bill is introduced 
into Parliament, the Government should ensure that the overall effect of each and 
every provision in the Bill is demonstrably deregulatory so that the Houses may be 
satisfied that each is within scope of the Bill.” 
 
87. The Committee in particular queried whether the order-making power and the Growth Duty 
were deregulatory and whether Clauses 29 and 33 & Schedule 14 were just shifting a 
burden. 
 
The Order-making Power 
 
88. In the Government’s view the order-making power (which has now been removed) that 
enables a Minister to disapply legislation that is no longer of practical use, was 
deregulatory. It would have allowed the Government to reduce the size of the statute book 
which in turn would save the time of lawyers and others who use it, as well as reducing the 
unnecessary costs that this creates. It would also save times for users who may rightly 
assume that an obsolete law is still in use if it appears on the statute book, and prevent 
them being misled. 
 
The Growth Duty 
 
89. As set out in the Government’s evidence to the Committee, the Government believes that 
the duty will have an overall deregulatory impact, principally by supporting less burdensome 
regulation for businesses. The final guidance, when published, will illustrate potential ways 
in which regulators may have regard to the growth duty, several of these point to this having 
deregulatory effects for individual businesses, for example: 
a. Keeping the burden on business productivity to a minimum. Regulators can directly 
influence a business’ growth prospects by avoiding unnecessarily diverting 
resources away from core operational or strategic activity. 
b. Being proportionate in their decision-making. This means ensuring that interactions 
with businesses are necessary and proportionate to the risks posed by non-
compliance and ability of the business to incorporate change. This applies to both 
the provision of advice and guidance and enforcement action. 
c. Understanding the business environment. This means tailoring regulatory activities 
according to an understanding of the business environment and stages in the 
business lifecycle, and applying this understanding when dealing with businesses 
on the ground. 
 
Clause 29 - Household Waste: Decriminalisation 
 
Paragraph No. 188. “In our view, for some of the provisions in the draft Bill – such as 
decriminalisation of household waste (clause 29) – the balance may well have 
resulted in an overall increase in burdens with a greater burden being placed on one 
part than is lifted from another”.” 
 
90. Clause 29 reduces the regulatory burden on householders by removing the criminal offence 
of failing to present waste for collection in line with local authority requirements. The 
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Government is clear that it is not right that individuals are treated like criminals if they put 
out their waste incorrectly. Moreover, the Government’s proposals do not add significant 
burdens compared to how the current arrangements operate in practice. The proposals are 
introduced to provide clarity on the process local authorities will need to follow when 
pursuing civil sanctions in this area. 
 
Clause 33 & Schedule 14 – Schools: reduction of burdens 
  
91. Clause 33 is a package of several measures designed to reduce burdens on schools. The 
Committee identified a risk that some of these proposals, (in particular, schools setting their 
own term dates, the removal of requirements to have regard to guidance on staffing matters 
and the proposed measure on behaviour) may not be truly deregulatory. For term dates and 
staffing matters, the Committee heard that the proposals just shifted a burden, rather than 
removing it and for the behaviour measures, the Committee heard that this was not a 
burden as it stood, so there was no need to remove it. 
 
92. On Schedule 14, part 3 (school term dates), many thousands of schools (voluntary aided 
schools, academies and free schools), educating around 48 per cent of all registered pupils 
in England, already have responsibility for their own term dates. The Government does not 
think that enabling all schools to set their own term dates will be a significant burden on 
them. Deregulation is also about removing laws and rules that get in the way of public 
sector bodies and making changes quickly that can benefit the way services are delivered. 
This deregulation makes it easier for schools to make innovative changes to their school 
year, including the ability to coordinate terms with other schools, to help pupils and parents. 
However, schools will be free to continue with the status quo. We see no rationale for 
restricting the freedom to vary the school year to some schools based solely on school 
type. 
 
93. Any burden would be relative to the decisions a school makes. If they decide, as the 
experience of academies suggests most will, to retain their existing term dates, then the 
burden of informing parents would be very low. Schools already communicate with parents 
regularly on a range of issues through their website, letters, email and so on. Local 
authorities have told us that they would continue to propose dates, but schools would be 
free to co-ordinate dates through a different mechanism if they wished to. If they decided to 
vary their existing term dates, for example moving to a five-term year, they would need to 
consider a range of issues and consult parents. It would be, however, for schools to decide 
whether to vary their existing term dates and so any burden on schools would be 
proportionate. The Government will publish new advice to schools to help them manage 
their new responsibilities. 
  
94. On Schedule 14, part 4 & 5: (Proposal to remove the statutory guidance on staffing matters) 
the Committee heard that there was a risk this would impose a burden on schools who 
would, as a result, need to seek advice individually. However, the Government would like to 
clarify that we are replacing the statutory guidance with non-statutory advice for all schools. 
 
95. On Schedule 14, part 1: (Proposal to remove the requirement for governing bodies to 
produce a statement of principles on behaviour) whilst the Committee heard that this  could 
just shift a burden, rather than removing it, the Government is clear that this is not the case. 
Currently the governing body of a maintained school is required to produce a written 
statement of general principles on behaviour, and the head teacher must have regard to 
that statement when determining the behaviour policy. This measure removes the 
requirement for the governing body to produce a written statement, but not their 
responsibility to ensure that the head teacher determines the overall behaviour policy, or 
their ability to influence its contents. The head teacher remains accountable to the 
governing body. The governing body can still help formulate the school’s behaviour policy 
but we will no longer specify how they should be involved. 
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Wider concerns 
 
96. The Committee identified some additional clauses which had evoked high levels of interest 
in both the Call for Evidence and in the evidence sessions. These were clauses 1, 2, 3, 9, 
28, 33, 35, 40 and 47 (the issues concerning Clauses 28 & 40 are dealt with in other parts 
of this response). 
 
Paragraph No. 237. “We have no doubt that Parliament will wish to be assured that 
the Government have taken full account of the possible consequences of these 
provisions [Clauses 1, 2, 3, 9, 28, 33 (and Schedule 14), 35, 40, 47] if they decide to 
take them forward into the Bill.” 
 
97. The Government has considered the Committee’s comments carefully and will continue to 
consider the consequences of these provisions as the Bill progresses through the House. A 
response to the comments is below. 
 
Clause 1 – Health and Safety at work: general duty of self-employed persons 
 
98. The Committee heard a wide variety of opinions on Clause 1 including that it would not lift a 
significant burden and that it could cause confusion. 
 
99. In his review of Health and Safety legislation, Professor Löfstedt recommended that self-
employed persons be exempt from Health and Safety law where they pose a low risk of 
harm to others through their work activity. The Government has accepted this 
recommendation. 
 
100. Clause 1 acts on that recommendation by exempting self-employed persons who do not 
pose a significant risk of harm to others from Health and Safety legislation. The Secretary of 
State can prescribe a list of those activities which would be expected to pose a risk of harm 
to others. Self-employed persons undertaking prescribed activities must comply with 
section 3(2) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. 
 
101. The Government has taken note of evidence to the Committee that confusion may arise as 
a result of the way the Clause is currently drafted. The Government, therefore, intends to 
make the prescribed list of high-risk work activities, where self-employed people will not be 
exempt from Health and Safety law, robust and clear so it is easy for self-employed persons 
to check and understand. To make this absolutely clear, the Clause will be adjusted to 
remove part b), so that all those self-employed persons who do not undertake activities on 
the prescribed list will clearly be exempt. 
 
Clause 2 – Removal of Employment tribunals’ power to make wider recommendations 
 
102. Some witnesses told the Committee that removing this provision would be unnecessary 
and premature. The Government does not agree. 
 
103. Since the power came into effect three years ago, around 28 Tribunal cases have been 
given wider recommendations. A clear pattern is already visible with around 70% of the 
recommendations focused around training for management or updating the diversity policy.  
It is unlikely that this pattern is going to change significantly going forward, or that much 
more would be learnt about the use of the power by reviewing it and allowing it to run on for 
several more years. 
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104. In order to assess the effectiveness of the power, the Government Equalities Office wrote in 
autumn 2013 to 27 of the employers who had received wider recommendations so far. They 
were asked whether they had taken forward those recommendations and how much it had 
cost them to do so.  Eight responses were received, six from private and civil sector 
employers. All the employers who responded had implemented the wider recommendations 
with an average cost to business of around £2,000. 
 
Clause 3 – English apprenticeships: simplification 
 
105. The Committee heard that these proposals could cause: a drop in quality; discrepancies 
between England and Wales; and additional burdens on employers: 
 
106. The Government’s intention is that the changes will facilitate a rise in quality rather than a 
fall. The recent review of apprenticeships by Doug Richard found that employers do not 
always feel that apprenticeships are relevant to their business. The changes give 
employers more control over the content of apprenticeships and how they are assessed. 
The Bill does not contain detail about the processes that will improve quality the 
Government does not think this is a matter for primary legislation. As new standards are 
developed and more detail emerges we hope this will reassure stakeholders of our 
continued commitment to the quality of apprenticeships. 
 
107. Apprenticeships are a devolved matter and currently each of the four nations has its own 
apprenticeship system with different content and rules. Although the Welsh system is 
similar to the current English system, there are significant differences, for example Wales 
and England have separate apprenticeship frameworks. The changes to English 
apprenticeship legislation are essential to implement government’s plans for the future of 
apprenticeships. The devolved administrations have been included in discussions about the 
changes to English apprenticeships. 
 
108. The Government does not believe that the changes place any extra burden on employers. 
Employers who wish to develop standards will be able to do so and the process will be as 
flexible and simple as possible. The proposed changes strip out much of the bureaucracy in 
the current system. We believe that the result of the change will be an increase in the 
relevance of apprenticeships. Employers will notice a significant improvement in 
apprenticeships and we expect that as a result more employers will want to offer 
apprenticeship places. We also plan to change the funding system for apprenticeships and 
will try to make the system as clear and simple as possible for employers including small 
businesses. 
 
Clause 9 – Authorisation of insolvency practitioners 
 
109. The Government believes that the change to allow specialised authorisation for insolvency 
practitioners (so that they can specialise in either the personal or corporate insolvency 
disciplines) will be deregulatory, as individuals seeking authorisation will only need to be 
qualified in their chosen discipline. Currently persons wishing to be authorised as 
insolvency practitioners have to take examinations in both personal and corporate 
insolvency, even though once authorised they may decide to specialise in one of those 
disciplines. Many insolvency practitioners already choose to specialise, yet existing 
regulation requires them to study areas that have little or no relevance to their work or are 
of benefit to their clients. The change will lift this burden and reduce training costs. 
 
110. Regulators will be able to offer specialised authorisation to their members but there will be 
no compulsion on them to do so. If existing regulators wish to only offer full authorisation 
they will be able to do so, alternatively they, or a new regulator, will be able to seek 
authorisation from the Secretary of State to offer partial authorisation. 
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111. It will still be possible for an individual to be fully authorised to act as an insolvency 
practitioner and practise in all categories of appointment. There will be no impact on 
existing authorisations or on insolvency practitioners who choose to be fully authorised in 
future. 
 
112. The Government does not believe that the change will reduce standards. All insolvency 
practitioners will be required to acquire a broad-based knowledge of insolvency, and those 
who choose to specialise will be qualified to the same extent as a fully authorised 
practitioner in that specialism. It is expected that clients will benefit from this specialism. It is 
possible that in the Individual Voluntary Arrangement sector, where an office-holder may be 
responsible for many hundreds of cases, that the ratio of authorised practitioners to 
insolvents will increase, which is likely to have a positive impact on standards. 
 
113. By reducing the barriers to entry, the changes are expected to improve accessibility to the 
insolvency practitioner market, thereby increasing competition which is good for consumers 
of insolvency services. The change will benefit new entrants to the market who will be able 
to save on training and examination fees. 
 
114. Some Scottish insolvency law is different to that in England and Wales, but insolvency 
procedures in Scotland are divided, as in England and Wales, between personal and 
corporate procedures, such that the principle of specialisation will bring the same benefits 
to competition and de-regulation. Whilst there are differences in the detail of the regimes 
between the jurisdictions there is no compelling reason why the Scottish insolvency market 
should not benefit from the change. 
 
115. The Government is engaging with regulators in Scotland, the insolvency profession and the 
Accountant in Bankruptcy the Scottish Government Agency with policy responsibility for 
devolved insolvency law, as to whether a partially authorised insolvency practitioner should 
be able to act as office-holder in a Scottish partnership, and whether special provision 
should be made for them. 
 
116. As stated earlier, following the Committee’s recommendation, the Government is inviting 
any further views on this Clause during the passage of the Bill. 
 
Clause 28 – Model clauses in petroleum licences: procedural simplification 
 
Paragraph No. 217. “We recommend in paragraph 170 that the Government undertake 
further consultation on this provision [Clause 28]. Furthermore, we recommend, in 
the light of responses to that consultation, that the Government consider whether 
the clause is in scope of the Bill and whether the delegation is fully justified.” 
 
117. As stated earlier, upon the Committee’s advice regarding levels of consultation, the 
Government has decided to remove this Clause, pending further consultation. While this 
Clause undergoes further consultation, DECC lawyers will consider the comments of the 
DPRRC and the deregulatory nature of the proposal further. 
 
Clause 33 – Schools: reduction of burdens 
 
118. The Committee received evidence about the following parts of Clause 33 & Schedule 14: 
Enabling schools to set their own term times; Removing the requirement for governing 
bodies to produce a statement on Behaviour; Staffing Matters and Home School 
Agreements 
 
119. On Schedule 14, part 3 (Enabling schools to set their own term times) the Committee 
received evidence giving mixed support for the proposal for schools to set their own term 
dates. ASCL told the committee that the risks of deregulating in this area were “fairly 
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minimal” given the pressure on schools from parents to maintain cohesion. Other witnesses 
felt it could lead to a lack of coordination and difficulties for working parents. 
 
120. The Government recognises the understandable concerns raised about parents with 
children in multiple schools. This proposal, however, will not lead to a total lack of 
coordination, sudden change without warning or unrecognisable term dates. Thousands of 
schools, educating around 48 per cent of all school-registered pupils, are already 
responsible for their own term dates. This experience suggests that most schools will make 
no changes as a result of this deregulation, and those that do will act sensibly and with the 
support of parents. 
 
121. The Government also recognises the value of schools setting term and holiday dates within 
a broad framework to help parents and others to plan holidays and work commitments, but 
believes schools should have greater autonomy. This is the position now for thousands of 
academies, free schools and voluntary-aided (church) schools. The Government wants all 
schools to have the freedom to change their school year, where there is a compelling need, 
without needing to seek agreement from the local authority. Removing the local authority’s 
formal role does not mean there would be no local co-ordination of dates. Local authorities 
have told the Government that they would continue to propose dates, which schools could 
decide to follow. Schools would be free to co-ordinate dates through a different mechanism 
if they wished to, for example, in an area of high seasonal employment. 
 
122. Term dates would only change where the governing body (which includes parent 
governors) initiate such changes and make decisions within the wider context; following 
consideration of parents’ views. All schools must act reasonably when setting term dates; 
which includes considering parents views and giving adequate notice. 
 
123. The Government has fully considered the impact of these proposals on working mothers 
and has prepared an impact and equality statement. Our judgement is that the pressure on 
schools from parents would mean that any changes, where the school decides to make 
them, would likely have a favourable impact on working mothers. We trust schools to act 
reasonably, taking parents views into account. Changes to term-dates could have 
significant benefits for working mothers, helping them to manage the summer holiday, work 
around seasonal employment, or making it easier to observe their religious festivals without 
damaging their child’s education. 
 
124. On Schedule 14 part 1: (Removing the requirement for governing bodies to produce a 
statement on Behaviour) the Committee heard that school governors are legally 
accountable for the school’s behaviour policy and must, therefore, remain involved in the 
process of determining its contents. 
 
125. These proposals are part of the moves to streamline the role of governing bodies, removing 
red tape and giving them the powers they need to get on with their strategic role of setting 
the direction for the school. These measures remove the requirement for the governing 
body to make and review a written statement of general principles, to which the head 
teacher is to have regard when determining a separate document called the ‘behaviour 
policy’. The Government is, however, clear that while the governing body would no longer 
be required to produce a statement they will still be able to influence the contents of the 
behaviour policy and hold the head teacher to account. 
 
126. Determining the behaviour policy will remain the responsibility of the head teacher under 
section 89 (1) of the Education and Inspections Act 2006. Under Regulation 6 of the School 
Governance (Roles Procedures and Allowances) (England) Regulations 2013, governing 
bodies will still have a wider strategic role to hold the head teacher to account for their core 
functions. 
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127. Informal soundings suggests that many governing bodies are unaware that they are 
currently required to produce this statement, and instead already simply focus on what the 
head teacher has included in the behaviour policy. Governors retain a strong role in this 
streamlined process. 
 
128. On Schedule 14 part 4 & 5 (Staffing Matters) The effect of this change would be the 
removal of the existing statutory guidance ‘Guidance on managing staff employment in 
schools’. Some witnesses identified a possible risk that this proposal would place a burden 
on schools to seek out and meet the costs of their own advice on staffing matters and a 
lack of consistency. 
 
129. The Government are mitigating that risk as this proposed reform is part of a package we 
are considering to improve the support we provide to schools in this area. In parallel we are 
reviewing the provisions within the School Staffing (England) Regulations. Our intention is 
to streamline and simplify these, with the aim of providing schools with greater autonomy 
over their own affairs and removing unnecessary requirements. 
 
130. To complement this, the Government intends to produce supporting non-statutory advice 
that clarifies the requirements of employment law and explains what additionally is required 
of school employers by education legislation. The advice will also signpost schools to 
sources of relevant advice, such as that provided by ACAS.  Our intention is that this advice 
will be relevant to all publically funded schools, not just maintained schools. 
 
131. On Schedule 14 part 2 (Home School Agreements) the Committee heard evidence on this 
proposal that was generally supportive, with ASCL, Voice and LGA welcoming the 
proposal, and the NGA noting that home school agreement are often little more than a “tick-
box exercise”. The Government recognises the point, made by NASWUT, that removing the 
duty could ‘send the wrong signal’ about parental engagement. We do not, however, feel 
that a requirement for schools to have home school agreements in place is the most 
effective way of ensuring parental engagement. All schools will be free to develop their own 
approaches to engaging parents that are best suited to the local context of the school and 
individual families. 
 
Clause 35 – Repeal of Senior President of Tribunals’ duty to report on standards 
 
132. The Committee heard evidence that the timing of these proposed changes, coming at a 
time of significant changes to the benefits system and an increase in the number of 
appeals, was a risk. However, the Government is clear that it has mitigated these risks. 
 
133. It is especially important that during the introduction of benefit appeals, feedback is as 
timely and useful as can be, and new initiatives such as the introduction of summary 
reasons reflect this. 
 
134. The removal of the duty to report on DWP decision making standards is not an attempt to 
remove transparency or accountability in the assessment of decision-making standards. 
Rather, it represents an attempt to reform the way in which decision makers received 
feedback from the Tribunal, and to ensure that that feedback is as useful as possible.  
 
135. MoJ Tribunal statistics, which includes appeal volumes and overturn rates, will continue to 
be published quarterly. These can be found at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/tribunals-statistics 
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Clause 40 – Repeal of powers to provide accommodation to persons temporarily admitted to the 
UK etc 
 
Paragraph No. 233. “We did not receive evidence on this clause [40] from these 
groups, but would encourage the Government to bring the matter to their attention 
and seek their views when conducting the consultation which we have 
recommended in paragraph 170 above.” 
 
136. The Government has removed the Clause pending further consultation. 
 
Clause 47 - Repeal of duties relating to consultation or involvement 
 
137. The Government believes that local authorities should be trusted to engage with local 
people without a duty being imposed on them to do so. Removal of this duty will free local 
authorities from unnecessary top down burdens and enable them to focus instead on 
serving their local communities. This fits in with the Government’s localism agenda. 
 
138. The Committee heard concerns from environmental groups, such as Friends of the Earth 
about whether this series of repeals might limit public participation, in particular in relation to 
environmental issues. However, these repeals will not adversely affect community 
involvement and the Secretary of State or the other public authority will continue to be able 
to consult where this is considered appropriate. 
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